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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
LEONARD D. WATERS, 
Deceased. 
HELENA WATERS, personal 
representative of the Estate of 
Leonard D. Waters, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
DARLA JORGENSON, JEANNA SCOTT, 
BARBARA D. REYNOLDS, THEORDORA 
ANN (TEDDI) BROWN, SHERRIE M. 
ALLAN, and FREDERICK L. WATERS, 
Respondents/Appellees 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
Case No. 20000017-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an interlocutory appeal pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
U.C.A. Jurisdiction of this appeal is in the Court of Appeals by 
Order of the Supreme Court, dated March 28, 2000. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT ISSUE 
Appellant has previously attached copies of certain sections 
of the Uniform Probate Code regarding allowances. Attached hereto 
as Addendum JA_ is a copy of §§78-11-6.5 and 7, the wrongful death 
statues in Utah. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
The deceased, Leonard D. Waters, died December 14, 1996. 
Petitioner is the personal representative of the Estate, and 
the surviving spouse. 
Respondents are the adult children of deceased; and they are 
not the children of the Petitioner. 
The Decedent, Leonard D. Waters, was married to Petitioner 
Helena Waters, at the time of his death. She has the following 
children (not minors), Respondents herein: Darla Jorgensen, Jeanna 
Scott, Barbara D. Reynolds, Theodora (Teddi) Brown, Sherry Allen, 
and Frederick Waters. The Decedent died intestate. At the time of 
his death, he held title in joint tenancy to a residence in Tooele, 
with his wife. He also had a pension with survivor benefits. Upon 
his death, a wrongful death action was filed in which all of the 
parties to this action were Plaintiff's. This Court, Hon. L. A. 
Dever, approved a settlement of the wrongful death action in which 
the proceeds of that wrongful death action were paid into the 
estate. A copy of that Order Approving Wrongful Death Settlement 
is included as Addendum 6 of the brief of Appellant. The estate 
consists largely of the proceeds of that action. Petitioner has 
also asked for a personal property allowance in the amount of 
$5,000 and a family allowance. These items were denied by the 
District Court, which also ordered an interpleader action filed to 
determine the shares to the various parties in the proceeds of the 
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wrongful death action. The supreme Court accepted this matter for 
interlocutory appeal, and assigned the case to this court for 
further proceedings. 
Statement of Facts 
Respondents accept the Statement of Facts submitted by 
Petitioner, except where specifically controverted herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Trial Court was under no obligation to defer to a previous 
ruling by a previous Trial Court Judge regarding the distribution 
of shares of the proceeds of a wrongful death action brought by the 
parties to this action. The Trial Court was not bound by "law of 
the case"; nor did the order of the previous Trial Court judge 
prohibit a determination of shares by the later judge, in the 
proceeds of the lawsuit. 
Petitioner is not entitled to a homestead exemption, as a 
homestead exemption of Utah is comprised of interest in real 
property which the decedent had at the time of his death. There 
was no such interest in real property. Neither is the Petitioner 
entitled to an exempt property allowance or a family allowance, at 
this time. The exempt property allowance is fact intensive, 
relying on what property there was, and what other assets the 
estate has. Those determinations have not been made. A family 
allowance is a short term benefit to tide the spouse and minor 
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children over until proceeds of an estate have been distributed. 
This request was made more than three years after the death; and 
during a period in which Petitioner was receiving a pension in 
behalf of the decedent. The equities of the situation cannot favor 
such an award. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS UNDER NO DUTY TO DEFER TO A PREVIOUS 
INTERLOCUTORY DECISION OF A PREVIOUS TRIAL JUDGE. 
As stated in paragraph 3 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts, 
the parties to this action were co-plaintiffs in a civil action in 
Clark County, Nevada for, among other things, wrongful death. As 
stated in paragraph 4 of the Statement of Facts, a settlement was 
reached. A substantial portion of the settlement was paid out for 
a medical lien, attorney's fees, and other expenses. No 
differentiation was made in the settlement between the various 
causes of action brought by the Plaintiffs therein. As stated in 
paragraph 5 of the Statement of Facts, the Nevada attorney for the 
various parties, indicated to those parties that he may have a 
conflict of interest involving the shares to the various parties. 
A stipulation was therefore entered into between the various 
plaintiffs to allow the proceeds of the settlement to be paid to 
decedent's estate, and for a later determination to be made 
regarding the proceeds. The stipulation was prepared by counsel 
for the estate, also counsel for Petitioner herein. No explanation 
was made to any of the plaintiffs regarding the legal consequences 
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of paying money into the Estate in Utah, rather than into some 
other entity. Clearly, in the minds of the individual plaintiffs, 
the arrangement was done for the simple purpose of getting the 
proceeds to Utah for a later determination as to the proper parties 
to be awarded those proceeds. 
As further stated in Petitioner's Statement of Facts, the 
Third District Court signed an order approving the settlement. The 
order did not state exactly as Petitioner claims, however. The 
order signed by Judge Dever stated: 
(9) The attorney for the Plaintiffs in said wrongful death 
action is hereby authorized and ordered to pay the net 
proceeds from the aforementioned settlement to the personal 
representative of decedent's estate, Helena Waters, or her 
attorney, for administration and subsequent distribution to 
heirs. 
The wording of the order reinforces the contention of 
Respondents herein that this was a measure of convenience, without 
a determination as to how the property would eventually be 
distributed. It was a simple Order to transfer the property to the 
jurisdiction of the Utah court. The court referred to the proceeds 
as that from "wrongful death" even though there.were other causes 
of action in which Petitioner might have had priority over the 
proceeds. Certainly this order was not meant to be contrary to law 
regarding the distribution of proceeds from a wrongful death 
action. 
Petitioner now wants this Court to determine that the 
agreement and order were designed to prioritize who would receive 
the benefits of the wrongful death action. There was no other 
entity for the money to be paid into. No hearing was held on the 
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effects of payment to the estate, rather than another independent 
escrow entity. Petitioner, who is also personal representative of 
the Estate, now claims that the money is hers, and that the laws of 
intestate succession apply, rather than Utah law regarding the 
proceeds of a wrongful death action. Because of the order of Judge 
Dever, they claim the matter is closed, and that the trial court 
herein (Judge Young) had no authority or jurisdiction, under "law 
of the case" to further deal with the money. That is obviously not 
correct. As set forth in AMS Salt Industries v. Magnesium Corp., 
942 P.2d 315 (Utah 1997), this doctrine would not apply in the 
current situation. The Utah Supreme Court there set forth a 
general rule: 
...that "one district court judge cannot* overrule another 
District Court judge of equal authority." However, there are 
several exceptions to this general rule. One exception is 
when "the issues decided by the first judge are presented to 
the second judge in a 'different light,7 as where a summary 
judgment initially denied is subsequently granted after 
additional evidence is adduced." (internal citations 
omitted)(emphasis in original). 942 P.2d at 319. 
The parties had been cooperating in an effort to prosecute the 
action for wrongful death in Nevada. Their joint attorney 
suggested that the money be transferred to the court in Utah for a 
further determination of shares. No independent counsel 
represented any of the parties in any portion of this proceeding. 
Only two weeks thereafter, however, Petitioner filed petitions for 
homestead allowance, personal property allowance and family 
allowance (Paragraph 8 of Petitioner's Statement of Facts). The 
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amount paid in to "the personal representative...for administration 
and subsequent distribution to heirs" made up the bulk of the 
estate property. When petitioner filed the petitions for the 
various allowances, it was clear now that she intended to have it 
all. She had sprung her trap. Her unsuspecting step-children, who 
might be entitled to a portion of the proceeds of the wrongful 
death action, now had to stand behind the "grieving widow" who had 
a long list of priorities which she intended to use to take it all. 
Obviously, Judge Young saw this situation in a far different light 
than did Judge Dever. As such, he was entitled to review the 
situation in terms of the situation as it then existed, not as it 
existed at the time of Judge Dever's order. The law of the case 
has no application here whatsoever. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS LEGALLY CORRECT IN ITS DECISION REGARDING 
PROCEEDS OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION. 
All of the parties to this action were named Plaintiffs in an 
action brought in Nevada for wrongful death. As indicated by 
Petitioner, the case was settled for the policy limits of the other 
party's insurance policy. The payment by the insurance company of 
$100,000.00 went partially to the attorney in Nevada, and for costs 
of litigation. The attorneys fee was one third, $33,333.33. Also 
deducted from the settlement was $30,000.00 on a subrogation claim 
by the health insurance plan of the decedent. The rest was paid 
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into the estate for distribution to the heirs. 
Petitioner now claims that the wrongful death action was not 
really a wrongful death action at all. Petitioner claims that it 
was, in part, an action by the estate for medical bills payable by 
the estate. No claim has been made by the estate for any such 
medical bills. Any such expenses were paid to the insurance 
company prior to the distribution to the estate and the heirs. 
Petitioner also claims that the causes of action brought in 
Nevada included loss of marital consortium. Utah does not 
recognize a cause of action for marital consortium. See Hackford 
v. Utah Power and Light Co. , 740 P.2d 1281 (Utah 1987) . The public 
policy of the State of Utah is clear. The distribution of the 
funds received from the wrongful death action are distributable 
under Utah law, not that of the State of Nevada. That was the very 
purpose for returning the proceeds to Utah for further proceedings. 
The decedent was a resident of the State of Utah and certainly did 
not have sufficient contacts in Nevada to warrant the use of Nevada 
law under accepted principles of conflicts of law. 
Obviously, the family talked together and felt it appropriate 
to bring the proceeds from the wrongful death action back to Utah 
for distribution. Only after that time, and almost three years 
after the date of death, did the Petitioner herein attempt to 
obtain the whole of the proceeds by making claims for various 
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allowances which were never made before. Petitioner, in arguing 
that she has been treated unfairly, certainly comes in with 
"unclean hands". Petitioner set up a trap for the other heirs, and 
sprang it on them as soon as the money was received in Utah. This 
court should not assist her in doing that. 
The State of Utah recognizes a wrongful death action as a 
statutory claim. According to Utah law, an estate may bring a 
claim of action for the benefit of the heirs. The leading case on 
this matter, Switzer v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244 (Utah 1980) states 
in relevant part: 
Under the wrongful death statute, there is but one cause of 
action, viz., it arises from a particular wrongful act for 
which there can be but one claim against the tort-feasor for 
damages. Whether the action be prosecuted by the personal 
representative or on or more of the heirs, it is for the 
benefit of the heirs, and all heirs are bound thereby. 606 
P.2d at 246. 
Under Utah law, the Estate holds the proceeds of a wrongful 
death action for the benefit of the heirs. Pursuant to §87-11-6.5 
U.C.A. the heirs include both the spouse and the children; and 
because the loss each suffered is a question of fact, the parties 
are not ranked in order of preference for shares of the recovery. 
The Nevada attorney was admittedly in no position to distribute to 
the various parties he represented, the shares of the proceeds. 
The short and simple agreements that the various parties filed with 
this court to pay the money into to the estate, were prepared by 
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the attorney for the petitioner. The petitioner was, pursuant to 
statute, the caretaker of any proceeds from the wrongful death 
action. She was also, of course, a prime claimant, a naturally 
conflicting position. Her attorney certainly had a conflict of 
interest as attorney for the Estate, the caretaker, and the 
attorney for the claimant, the widow. There is no claim made by 
the widow or her attorney that they made the other Plaintiffs aware 
of the conflict between the Estate as caretaker, and the self-
serving personal representative. Counsel may have appeared to be 
working for the common good, as had been done by the attorney in 
Nevada, when he drafted the agreement to pay the money to the 
Estate. Nevertheless, he was not doing so. 
If he did this with a conscious intent to eliminate any claim 
the other Plaintiffs may have had to the proceeds of the wrongful 
death claim, he certainly violated Rule 1.7 of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct by not explaining the conflict; and the 
agreement should not be enforced in this manner. The filing, about 
two weeks later, of the petitions for homestead, personal property 
allowance and family allowance certainly points to a planned 
attempt to eliminate any shares of the proceeds of the lawsuit to 
anybody outside of the personal representative. The agreement 
should be read as a simple means to bring the money to Utah for 
further proceedings -- not to extinguish the shares of the children 
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of the decedent. 
This reading of Judge Dever's Order seems to be borne out by 
following paragraph: 
8. Since the aforementioned settlement did.not differentiate 
between the various claims of the estate and those of the 
individual Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs stipulated and agreed 
that the net proceeds from the settlement of the 
aforementioned lawsuit shall be considered an asset of the 
decedent's estate and shall be distributed to the heirs of 
decedent's estate according to the laws of intestate 
succession of the State of Utah. (Emphasis added). 
This seems to point to a conclusion that a determination had 
not yet been made as to the status of the various claims of the 
plaintiffs. Therefore, the Order says that the proceeds have been 
turned over to the estate for distribution to the heirs. While the 
order does mention "intestate succession" it certainly would be 
fair to read the term "heirs" in the manner set forth in the 
statute on wrongful death. In other words, the shares due to the 
heirs is a factual determination to be made on the basis of the 
loss. 
Petitioner, in her brief, states that her attorney "may have 
inadvertently contributed to that misconception by Respondent in 
entitling her petition as a "Petition for Approval of Wrongful 
Death Settlement". (Aplt. Br. 11). Petitioner's attorney drafted 
the agreements, the petition, and the order. The stepchildren, who 
had been jointly represented by a single attorney with Petitioner 
in Nevada, were certainly unaware that the circumstances had 
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changed. The attorney drafting the documents at this point was 
clearly adverse to them; but they were never directed to obtain 
their own counsel. It is basic to American Jurisprudence that, 
where one party drafts a document containing ambiguities, those 
ambiguities should be resolved against the party who has drawn the 
contract. See Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982). The 
agreements, the petition, and the order are ambiguous as to whether 
the proceeds of the Nevada lawsuit were paid into the personal 
representative as caretaker, or for her sole benefit. Those 
ambiguities should be resolved against her. 
The trial court, in ordering an interpleader in this action, 
did the only thing that made sense. An interpleader is defined by 
Rule 22 U.R.C.P. The function of an interpleader is to compel 
conflicting complainants to litigate their claims among themselves. 
See Maycock v. Continental Life Ins. Co., 79 Utah 248, 9 P.2d 179 
(1932) . The Court determined that the personal representative held 
money as a result of a legal action in which both Petitioner and 
Respondents were Plaintiffs. The Court was correct in ruling that 
no final determination of the relative shares of the parties had 
yet been made, and that the personal representative still held the 
proceeds without specific instructions as to how to handle them. 
The Interpleader action was necessary to make that final 
determination. Further, the public policy arguments that she makes 
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for a larger share of the proceeds are within the purview of an 
Interpleader action pursuant to Rule 22. The trial court did not 
decided that Petitioner will get nothing from the proceeds of the 
wrongful death action. The court did not decide she in fact is not 
entitled to all of it. It simply decided that both sides should 
have a fair hearing to determine, on the equities of the situation, 
who should get what. The court is entitled to review the entire 
situation once an interpleader has been filed, and to determine how 
the proceeds should be equitably distributed. 
POINT III 
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO A HOMESTEAD ALLOWANCE UNDER UTAH 
LAW. 
Petitioner has made claims against Estate property sufficient 
to make sure that there is no property or proceeds of the wrongful 
death action left for any heir, other than herself. The agreement 
between the parties that the proceeds would be paid into the estate 
was done on the assumption that all of the family members would 
take something thereunder. Otherwise, there would have been no 
agreement. Petitioner argues that the homestead allowance in the 
form of real property only is "outmoded". The law on the matter, 
Section 75-2-401 U.C.A., states nothing of the kind. Respondents 
believe that the word "homestead" means exactly what is says. The 
only other place that a homestead is mentioned in the Utah Code is 
§ 78-23-3, et seq., in which a "homestead exemption" also in the 
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deceased left a wife and six children, none of whom are the 
offspring of the wife. The residence was in joint tenancy; and the 
residence was the main item of value in which the deceased had an 
interest. Petitioner has received that, by action of law. The law 
allows children who are not also the children of the surviving 
spouse to receive some part of the estate, after certain 
deductions. Petitioner, as the surviving spouse, gets the lion's 
share. To read the law as suggested by Petitioner is to entirely 
disinherit the rest of the family. This is, as Petitioner admits, 
a case of first impression, at least as far as appellate courts in 
this state are concerned. Respondents ask that the plain meaning 
of the statute be applied, and that they retain some interest in 
the Estate. 
Petitioner admits that originally a homestead allowance or 
exemption was, in fact, an interest in real property owned by the 
decedent at his death. This Petitioner argues, however, that the 
Uniform Probate Code changed that interest to one in money, rather 
than specific property. In support of that proposition, she sites 
cases in Montana and Idaho. The Montana case, Matter of Estate of 
Merkel, 618 P. 2d 872 (Mont. 1980) comes to that conclusion after 
this interesting observation: 
The courts of other states which have enacted the Uniform 
Probate Code (UPC) have not considered this question, nor do 
the Commission's comments, specifically address this issue. 
Pre-Code law in Montana indicates that the homestead was a 
life estate only. The purpose of the homestead was to 
preserve the fee interest for the heirs of the decedent, while 
setting aside a life estate, safe from creditors, for the 
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spouse and family of the decedent. 618 P. 2d 876. 
It is only because the new Probate Code eliminated the 
reference to life estate, that the Montana Court determined that 
the homestead allowance can now be in the form of personal property 
or money. Arizona allows the homestead allowance as money rather 
than an interest in specific property, by specific statute, "in 
lieu of any homestead". See A.R.S.§ 021 14-2401. The Colorado 
Court of Appeals, in In re Estate of Robbie J. Dodge, 685 P.2d 260 
(Colo. App. 1984) referred to a homestead exemption as outdated. 
Nevertheless, they upheld it as an interest in real estate. In the 
trial court, Petitioner cited the California case of Estate of 
Liccardo, 232 Cal.App.3d 962 (Cal. App. 6 District 1991) for the 
proposition that only property within the jurisdiction of the 
Probate Court can be selected as a homestead allowance. The Court 
also found that only real property qualifies in California for a 
homestead exemption or allowance; and no reference is made to that 
case in Plaintiff's of Petitioner's brief here. 
Petitioner also cites the case of Matter of Estate of Wagley, 
760 P.2d 316 (Utah 1988) for the proposition that the right of a 
surviving spouse to an exempt personal property allowance is 
absolute. In a footnote, Petitioner states "the Wagley decision 
does not discuss homestead allowances because no homestead 
allowance was ever claimed in that case." (Aplt. Br. 20). No 
homestead allowance was requested in that case for the very reason 
that no homestead allowance is authorized here. The Supreme Court 
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treated the question in a matter of fact manner: "In the case 
before us, the decedent left no real estate, and no homestead 
exemption was therefore claimed." 760 P.2d 318. The reference to 
§ 75-2-402 of the Utah Code was to a statute which remained 
unchanged until after the death of decedent herein. Thus, there is 
no homestead allowance for Petitioner to claim, as there was no 
real estate belonging to decedent. 
POINT IV 
PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPT PROPERTY ALLOWANCE OF A 
FAMILY ALLOWANCE. 
Petitioner, incredibly, does not directly address the issuance 
of the requested Exempt Property Allowance or the Family Allowance 
in her brief, though she has included them as issues in her appeal. 
Petitioner asks for an exempt property allowance pursuant to 
§ 75-2-402 U.C.A. Leonard Waters died on December 14, 1996. The 
Petitioner has been in sole custody and control of all property and 
income for three years. No accounting whatsoever has been made of 
anything that has been obtained, sold, or used up, during those 
three years. Without a formal accounting, it simply cannot be 
determined whether "there is not $5,000 worth of exempt property in 
the Estate". An additional allowance of cash clearly cannot be 
made until that determination by the Court is final. 
After three years, Petitioner now also asks for a family 
allowance pursuant to Section 75-2-403. Once again, this is 
another nail in the coffin, designed to prohibit any other member 
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of the family from obtaining any of the proceeds of the wrongful 
death action. The purpose of the statute is to obtain "a 
reasonable allowance in money out of the estate for the maintenance 
during the administration." This allowance is due to the surviving 
spouse and the minor children. There are no minor children. 
Petitioner admittedly continues to receive a pension from the 
former employment of the deceased. Petitioner suggests that the 
amount of the pension benefits were decreased after Mr. Waters 
died. She now suggests that the estate should make up that 
difference in the form of a family allowance. As the trial court 
indicated in oral arguments on the matter, a widow's allowance 
under a pension plan is deliberately less than the payments would 
be if the Decedent had continued to live. That is because it costs 
one person considerably less to live than it costs for two. This 
is not a reasonable allowance for maintenance during the 
administration. That should have been applied for and granted 
three years ago. Instead, it is one last attempt to make sure that 
the rest of the family receives nothing. That attempt should be 
denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court's rulings regarding the. proceeds of the 
wrongful death action, should be affirmed. The Trial Court simply 
required an evidentiary proceeding determine the equities of the 
situation; and the law favors such proceedings. Petitioner is not 
entitled to additional allowances that she claims, and the Trial 
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required an evidentiary proceeding determine the equities of the 
situation; and the law favors such proceedings. Petitioner is not 
entitled to additional allowances that she claims, and the Trial 
Court should be affirmed in that regard as well. 
DATED this day of September, 2000. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, LLC 
M-
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^s" [ day of September, 2000, 
I did mail two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellees, postage prepaid, to: 
Wynn Bartholomew, Esq. 
5505 South 900 East 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84117 
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ADDENDUM 
A. The Utah Wrongful Death Statute 
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ADDENDUM A 
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78-11-1 JUDICIAL CODE 578 
Section 
78-11-3. Deserted spouse. 
78-11-4. Seduction — Unmarried individual under 18 
may sue. 
78-11-5. Seduction of child — Suit by parent or guard-
ian. 
78-11-6. Injury or death of child — Suit by parent or 
guardian. 
78-11-6.5. Definition of heir. 
78-11-7. Death of adult — Suit by heir or personal 
representative. 
78-11-8. Successive actions on same contract. 
78-11-9. Repealed. 
78-11-10. Actions against officers — Costs and attorneys' 
fees. 
78-11-11. Submitting controversy without action. 
78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or death 
upon death of wrongdoer or injured person 
— Exception and restriction to out-of-pocket 
expenses. 
78-11-12.5. Repealed. 
78-11-13. Construction of statute. 
78-11-14. Shoplifting — Definitions. 
78-11-15. Civil liability of adult for shoplifting — Dam-
ages. 
78-11-16. Joint liability of minor and parent or guardian 
for minor's shoplifting — Exception. 
78-11-17. Merchant's right to request customer to hold 
merchandise in full view. 
78-11-18. Merchant's authority to detain. 
78-11-19. Criminal conviction for shoplifting not a pre-
requisite for civil action under chapter — 
Written notice required — Award of penalty 
not subject to requirement of compensatory 
or general damages. 
78-11-20. Property damage caused by a minor — Liabil-
ity of parent or legal guardian. 
78-11-20.5. Criminal conviction for criminal mischief or 
criminal trespass not a prerequisite for civil 
action under chapter. 
78-11-20.7. Compensatory service — Graffiti penalties. 
78-11-21. Property damage caused by minor — When 
parent or guardian not liable. 
78-11-22. Good Samaritan Act. 
78-11-22.1. Donation of food — Liability limits. 
78-11-22.2. Donation of nonschedule drugs or devices — 
Liability limitation. 
78-11-23. Right to life — State policy. 
78-11-24. Act or omission preventing abortion not action-
able. 
78-11-25. Failure or refusal to prevent birth not a de-
fense. 
78-11-26. Employer not to discharge or threaten em-
ployee for responding to subpoena — Crimi-
nal penalty — Civil action by employee. 
78-11-27. Defense to civil action for damages resulting 
from commission of crime. 
78-11-1. Married w o m a n . 
A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner 
as if she were unmarried. 1953 
78-11-2. Husband and wife sued together — Either 
may defend. 
If husband and wife are sued together, the wife may defend 
for her own right, and if either neglects to defend, the other 
may defend for both. 1953 
78-11-3. Deserted spouse. 
When a husband has deserted his family, the wife may 
prosecute or defend in his name any action which he might 
have prosecuted or defended, and shall have the same powers 
and rights therein as he might have, and, under like circum-
stances, the husband shall have the same right. 1953 
78-11-4. Seduction — Unmarried individual under 18 
may sue. 
An unmarr ied individual, under 18 years of age at the time 
of seduction, may prosecute as plaintiff an action therefor, and 
may recover therein such damages, actual or exemplary as are 
assessed in favor of such individual. 1977 
78-11-5. Seduction of child — Suit by parent or guard-
ian. 
A parent or guardian may prosecute as plaintiff an action for 
the seduction of a child who, at the time of seduction, is under 
the age of majority, though the child or the ward is not living 
with or in the service of the plaintiff at the time of the 
seduction or afterwards and there is no loss of service. 1977 
78-11-6. Injury or death of child — Suit by parent or 
guardian. 
Except as provided in Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Com-
pensation Act, a parent or guardian may maintain an action 
for the death or injury of a minor child when the injury or 
death is caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another. Any 
civil action may be maintained against the person causing the 
injury or death or, if the person is employed by another person 
who is responsible for tha t person's conduct, also against the 
employer. If a parent, stepparent, adoptive parent, or legal 
guardian is the alleged defendant in an action for the death or 
injury of a child, a guardian ad litem may be appointed for the 
injured child or a child other t han the deceased child according 
to the procedures outlined in Section 78-7-9. 1996 
78-11-6.5. Definit ion of heir. 
As used in Sections 78-11-7, 78-11-8, and 78-11-12, "heirs" 
means: 
(1) the following surviving persons: 
(a) the decedent's spouse; 
(b) the decedent's children as provided in Section 
75-2-114; 
(c) the decedent's natural parents, or if the dece-
dent was adopted, then his adoptive parents; 
(d) the decedent's stepchildren who: 
(i) are in their minority at the time of dece-
dent's death; and 
(ii) are primarily financially dependent on the 
decedent. 
(2) "Heirs" means any blood relative as provided by the 
law of intestate succession if the decedent is not survived 
by a person under Subsections (l)(a), (b), or (c). 1998 
78-11-7. Death of adult •— Suit by heir or personal 
representative. 
Except as provided in Title 35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Com-
pensation Act, when the death of a person not a minor is 
caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another, his heirs, or 
his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may 
maintain an action for damages against the person causing 
the death, or, if such person is employed by another person 
who is responsible for his conduct, then also against such 
other person. If such adult person has a guardian at the time 
of his death, only one action can be maintained for the injury 
to or death of such person, and such action may be brought by 
either the personal representatives of such adult deceased 
person, for the benefit of his heirs, or by such guardian for the 
benefit of the heirs as provided in Section 78-11-6. In every 
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action under this and Section 78-11-6 such damages may be 
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just. 
1996 
78-11-8. Successive actions on same contract. 
Successive actions may be maintained upon the same con-
tract or transaction whenever, after a former action, a new 
cause of action arises therefrom. 1953 
78-11-9. Repealed. 1971 
78-11-10. Actions against officers — Costs and attor-
neys' fees. 
Before any action may be filed against any sheriff, con-
stable, peace officer, state road officer, or any other person 
charged with the duty of enforcement of the criminal laws of 
this state, or service of civil process, when such action arises 
out of, or in the course of the performance of his duty, or in any 
action upon the bond of any such officer, the proposed plaintiff, 
as a condition precedent thereto, shall prepare and file with, 
and at the time of filing the complaint in any such action, a 
written undertaking with at least two sufficient sureties in an 
amount to be fixed by the court, conditioned upon the diligent 
prosecution of such action, and, in the event judgment in the 
said cause shall be against the plaintiff, for the payment to the 
defendant of all costs and expenses that may be awarded 
against such plaintiff, including a reasonable attorney's fee to 
be fixed by the court. In any such action, the prevailing party 
therein shall, in addition to an award of costs as otherwise 
provided, recover from the losing party therein such sum as 
counsel fees as shall be allowed by the court. The official bond 
of any such officer shall be liable for any such costs and 
attorney fees. i953 
78-11-11. Submitting controversy without action. 
Parties to a question in difference, which might be the 
subject of a civil action, may without action agree upon a case 
containing the facts upon which the controversy depends, and 
present a submission of the same to any court which would 
have jurisdiction if an action had been brought. But it must 
appear by affidavit that the controversy is real, and that the 
proceeding is in good faith, to determine the rights of the 
parties. The court must thereupon hear and determine the 
case and render judgment thereon as if an action were 
pending.
 1953 
78-11-12. Survival of action for injury to person or 
death upon death of wrongdoer or injured 
person — Exception and restriction to out-of-
pocket expenses. 
(1) (a) Causes of action arising out of personal injury to the 
person or death caused by the wrongful act or negligence 
of another do not abate upon the death of the wrongdoer 
or the injured person. The injured person or the personal 
representatives or heirs of the person who died have a 
cause of action against the wrongdoer or the personal 
representatives of the wrongdoer for special and general 
damages, subject to Subsection (l)(b). 
(b) If prior to judgment or settlement the injured per-
son dies as a result of a cause other than the injury 
received as a result of the wrongful act or negligence of 
the wrongdoer, the personal representatives or heirs of 
that person are entitled to receive no more than the 
out-of-pocket expenses incurred by or on behalf of that 
injured person as the result of his injury. 
(2) Under Subsection (1) neither the injured person nor the 
personal representatives or heirs of the person who died may 
recover judgment except upon competent satisfactory evidence 
other than the testimony of that injured person. 1991 
78-11-12.5. Repealed. i 9 9 6 
78-11-13. Construction of s tatute . 
This act shall not be construed to be retroactive. 1953 
78-11-14. Shoplifting — Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Minor" means any unmarried person under 18 
years of age. 
(2) "Merchandise" means any personal property dis-
played, held or offered for sale by a merchant. 
(3) "Merchant" means an owner or operator of premises 
in which merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale 
and includes his employees, servants and agents. 
(4) "Premises" means a store or establishment wherein 
merchandise is displayed, held or offered for sale. 
(5) "Wrongful taking of merchandise" means the taking 
of merchandise that has not been purchased from a 
merchant's premises without the permission of the mer-
chant or one of his employees, servants or agents. 1981 
78-11-15. Civil liability of adult for shoplifting — Dam-
ages. 
An adult who wrongfully takes merchandise by any means, 
including but not limited to, concealment or attempted con-
cealment in any manner, either on or off the premises of the 
merchant, with a purpose to deprive a merchant of merchan-
dise or to avoid payment for merchandise, or both, is liable in 
a civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to 
the merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchan-
dise not to exceed $1,000, plus an additional penalty as 
determined by the court of not less than $100 nor more than 
$500, plus court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. 1992 
78-11-16. Joint liability of minor and parent or guard-
ian for minor's shoplifting — Exception. 
A minor and the parents or legal guardian having legal 
custody of such minor, as the case may be, who wrongfully 
takes merchandise by any means, including but not limited to, 
concealment or attempted concealment in any manner, either 
on or off the premises of the merchant, with a purpose to 
deprive a merchant of merchandise or to avoid payment for 
the merchandise, or both, are jointly and severally liable in a 
civil action, in addition to actual damages, for a penalty to the 
merchant in the amount of the retail price of the merchandise 
not to exceed $500 plus an additional penalty as determined 
by the court of not less than $50 nor more than $500, plus 
court costs and reasonable attorneys' fees. No parent or 
guardian is liable for damages under this section if he or she 
made a reasonable effort to restrain the wrongful taking and 
did not fail to report it to the merchant involved or to the law 
enforcement agency having primary jurisdiction after he or 
she knew of the minor's unlawful act. No report is required 
under this section from a parent or guardian if the minor was 
arrested or apprehended by a peace officer or by anyone acting 
on behalf of the merchant involved. 1991 
78-11-17. Merchant's right to request customer to hold 
merchandise in full view. 
Any merchant may request any individual on his premises 
to place or keep in full view any merchandise such individual 
may have removed, or which the merchant has reason to 
believe he may have removed, from its place of display or 
elsewhere, whether for examination, purchase or for any other 
reasonable purpose. No merchant shall be criminally or civilly 
liable on account of having made such a request. 1975 
78-11-18. Merchant's authority to detain. 
Any merchant who has reason to believe that merchandise 
has been wrongfully taken by an individual contrary to 
Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 and that he can recover such 
merchandise by taking such individual into custody and 
detaining him may, for the purpose of attempting to effect such 
